Before and after 2009, all major press groups in Fujian started to establish e-newspapers and transfer the newspaper contents to their official news websites to cope with the loss of readers as a result of the prevalence of computer technology as well as to maintain and expand the influence of traditional media. The popularity of Weibo and WeChat emerged between 2011 and 2012, thereby prompting the local press groups in Fujian to try out both platforms. During this period, newspapers were the pillar of the press groups’ revenue. Within most press groups in Fujian, Weibo and WeChat remained under the operation of newspaper editors and journalists on a part-time basis and received limited emphasis from the leadership.
A professional company was commissioned to transcribe the anonymously processed materials. The tape scripts were then analysed in three phases. Firstly, a preliminary coding was accomplished by performing a line-by-line coding of the transcription as well as by defining the segments relevant to the issues under investigation. Secondly, new codes were formed by synthesising the preliminary codes, with focus laid on frequently occurring segments. Lastly, the new codes, between which the association was explored, were rearranged where it was used as basis for the construction of a consistent theoretical exposition.
Moreover, most journalists willing to provide news to the new media centres are from party organs, whereas the majority of the metropolis newspaper journalists resisted collaboration. To understand the reason behind such contrast, note that new media centres are governed by party organs in terms of administrative hierarchy and are completely independent of metropolis newspaper offices in terms of finances. Compared with the metropolis newspapers, the party organ has relatively few barriers to the new media centres and a high degree of resource sharing. Such disparity has resulted in an operational obstacle between metropolis newspaper offices and the new media centre. To the new media leadership, this obstacle is precisely the underlying reason for newspapers and the new media to continue to be integrated but stay incompatible. The pattern of this relationship affects journalists’ willingness to collaborate.

One of the goals of media convergence in the reconstruction process is to modify the journalist–editor relationship by veering from ‘journalist-centred’ to ‘editor-centred’, such that journalists shall mainly undertake the role of information gatherer, whereas editors perform the role of information synthesiser. Regarding real news production, most new media centre editors are recruited from the members of society who are familiar with new media but inexperienced in news gathering and editing; thus, they are mere ‘stevedores’ rather than ‘processors’ of texts. Given that editors lacked the required qualifications, journalists were forced to undertake additional tasks (e.g., verifying information and converting statements from frontline journalists into text) that should have been performed by editors.
The impetus for junior journalists to participate in the converging news production is the same consideration that prevents senior journalists from collaborating with the new media centre, that is, to achieve the balance between gain and cost. The industry and the journalists ‘inside the system’ (tizhinei) are likely to opt for political safety over financial return, whereas their counterparts ‘outside the system’ (tizhiwai) ascribe considerable importance to the latter than the former.
Only six days after the first Mop post about the video, the kitten killer’s home was revealed as the town of Luobei in Heilongjiang Province, in the far northeast, and her name — Wang Jiao — was made public, as were her phone number and her employer. Wang Jiao and the cameraman who filmed her were dismissed from what the Chinese call iron rice bowls, government jobs that usually last to retirement and pay a pension until death.
As Fimoculous points out, there have been American analogues to the renrou sousuo yingqing in some of the mass actions taken by 4chan: They too tracked down a cat abuser based on a video posted on the Internet. But the Human Flesh Search Engine is all the more important for filling in gaps in the Chinese legal system: whereas 4chan collaborated with police in their cat abuse case, China doesn’t have clear animal abuse laws, and so mass shaming had to come before legal action. Lest you decide that that sort of vigilantism is an entirely good thing, the Human Flesh Search Engine has also turned its ire on Chinese citizens who they don’t think are patriotic enough and journalists who call for moderation on Tibet.
Approaches to writing instruction developed in North America have gradually made their presence felt in other parts of the world during recent years. A curricular evaluation of the local needs, instruction, assessments, teacher preparation, and other pedagogical factors is crucial for the successful transmission and integration of those approaches into the new contexts. Set against the background of recent, exuberant scholarly discussions of the issue of transplanting Western writing pedagogies, this article presents an observational report of a typical college English curriculum for non-majors in China, with a focus on its writing component. The study has found that English writing is taught under the guidance of a nationally unified syllabus and examination system. Rather than assisting their students to develop thoughts in writing, teachers in this system are predominantly concerned about the teaching of correct form and test-taking skills. Because of their relatively low economic status in China, English teachers have to work extra hours and have little time to spend on individual students or on furthering their professional training. However, signs of recent Western writing pedagogies, such as pre-writing and multiple-drafting activities, are identified in classrooms and textbook publishing, which indicate the possibility of successful adaptations of the recent Western writing pedagogies in the Chinese context.

Over the course of media reform in the past four decades, economic and technological logic has definitely been significantly adherent to political logic, thereby exerting an influence under the latter’s framework. For example, propaganda has been given a high priority as a function that the Chinese media must perform throughout the process of media reform. Nevertheless, the tension between profiting and propaganda, market and state provides space for the strategic development of the media industries within China.


Li, M. (2017). Jishu chuanbo xingzhi kecheng de sheji yu shixian tansuo: yi tongji daxue shiyong yingyu xiezuoke weili (Design and practice of courses with TC features—Case study of practical english writing course at Tongji University). Shanghai Ligong Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban )(Journal of University of Shanghai for Science and Technology), 39(2), 101–107. [李梅. (2017). 技术传播性质课程的设计与实现探索——以同济大学实用英语写作课为例.《上海理工大学学报(社会科学版)》39(2), 101–107].Google Scholar
Specifically, information released in new media outlets emphasise timeliness. The irreconcilable conflict between such requirement and the principle of accuracy in news reportage concerns many journalists. In China, the common rule of thumb in terms of news production is that ‘the writer is responsible for the consequences of this article’. Journalists are obliged to take full responsibility for all issues engendered by the news under their name. The risk of ‘more mistakes with more releases’ is a shadow that follows news production as a by-product of the censorship system. Thus, the journalists in Fujian’s press groups disregard the new system of censorship as a ‘buffer’ that could protect them from various risks, particularly political ones. When journalists believe that the risk they may undertake outweighs the financial return they will attain, they choose not to cooperate.
61 After 9 April those Beijingers with the most negative views of Japan avoided newspapers. See D. Stockmann, “What kind of information does the public demand? Getting the news during the 2005 anti-Japanese protests,” in S. Shirk (ed.), Changing Media, Changing China, forthcoming. Since non-readers were excluded from the statistical analysis, avoidance did not influence the empirical results presented here.
67 The side with higher audience costs is less likely to back down in a foreign crisis and therefore able to signal its intentions to other states more credibly than states with lower audience costs. Fearon, J.D., “Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), pp. 577–92. Weiss, “Powerful patriots: nationalism, diplomacy and the strategic logic of anti-foreign protest.”
×