The impetus for junior journalists to participate in the converging news production is the same consideration that prevents senior journalists from collaborating with the new media centre, that is, to achieve the balance between gain and cost. The industry and the journalists ‘inside the system’ (tizhinei) are likely to opt for political safety over financial return, whereas their counterparts ‘outside the system’ (tizhiwai) ascribe considerable importance to the latter than the former.

Generally, the journalists’ reluctance to collaborate can be explained under the binary structure of ‘traditional media versus new media’, which is manifested at three levels. At the institutional level, the antithesis of traditional media versus new media is represented as the schism between ‘inside the system’ and ‘outside the system’. Given the impact of new media and the existing ideological control, the Fujian press industry has opted to sacrifice part of its economic gains for political security, which is also an option for journalists ‘inside the system’. At the organisational level, the antithesis is manifested as the enmity between the traditional and the new media departments. Divergent interests have made the leaders and journalists of metropolis newspapers less willing to cooperate with the centre compared with their counterparts from the party organs. At the individual level, the binary structure is manifested as the competition between professional journalists and other we-media runners. Faced with challenges from non-professional information providers, most journalists opt to follow their occupational boundaries and refrain from adding their voice to the new media.

Guānyú “Hàn-Yīng Yànyǔ Cídiǎn”: Xiàndài Yǔyán qīkān duì Luósēnnuò (Rohsenow) cídiǎn de píngjià shì “dàigěi rén yúkuài tǐyàn, yìyú shǐyòng ... wèi pǔtōng Yīngyǔ dúzhě kāiqǐ le Zhōngguó mínjiān zhìhuì de bǎokù ... duì rènhé jíbié de yǔyán xuéshēng hé rènhé xūyào jīngpì géyán de rén dōu shì jí jù xīyǐnlì qiě shífēn shòuyì de.” (89, 2005). Yóu Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ (zhǐzhìbǎn de biānzhìzhě) kāifā de xīnbǎn ruǎnjiàn wèi xuéxí yànyǔ zhè yī bǎoguì zīyuán zēngtiān le xīn de wéidù. Ruǎnjiàn bǎnběn zhuān wèi pèihé Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn 4.2 huò gèng gāo bǎnběn shǐyòng ér shèjì. Yōngyǒu Wénlín qiángdà de ABC diànzǐ cídiǎn de quánbù jíhé, yìwèizhe jiǎntǐ hé fántǐ Zhōngwén de dúzhě kěyǐ shíshí fǎngwèn gèzhǒnggèyàng de cítiáo yǐ tànqiú Luósēnnuò jiàoshòu jīngliáng fānyì de wēimiào zhī chù, bìng lǐjiě Zhōngwén yànyǔ gēng shēnkè de hányì.
The historical course of China’s media reform is coincidental with the intrinsic logic of the transformation in national political ideology from contradiction theory to economy-centric theory (Li and Hu, 2013). However, this situation does not mean that political determinism would suffice to explain the China’s media reform. The transformation towards media groups did not result in mere innovation in the size, structure and managerial ideal of the media industries but also the ‘self-consciousness’ of actively promoting economic gains and the tendency to transform capitalism, ownership and other concepts into the reasonable kernel of media reform (Li and Hu, 2013). These have transcended far beyond the scope of what ‘political correctness’ can explain.
Lā Qiáolā (La Jolla), Jiālìfúníyàzhōu -- Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ, Zhōngwén Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn Wénlín hé CDL zìtǐ jìshù kāifāshāng, xuānbù tuīchū Wénlín Miǎnfèibǎn 4.2 bǎn. Wénlín zuìxīn de 4.2 miǎnfèibǎn ruǎnjiàn kě zài wǎngshàng (wenlinshangdian.com) miǎnfèi xiàzài. Miǎnfèi bǎnběn bāokuò sān ge cídiǎn, bāohán gòngjì 1100 duō ge cítiáo, 200 duō ge yùzhì chōurènkǎ de cíhuì xìnxī, bìng kěyǐ chuàngjiàn xīn cídiǎn; 1,400 duō ge chángyòngzì de zhú bǐ yǎnshì; jiǎntǐ, fántǐ hé pīnyīn de shìlì wénběn. Gōngnéng qiángdà de miǎnfèibǎn kě xiǎnshì chāoguò 80,000 ge Hànzì, dàiyǒu wánzhěng de Unicode 7.1 “Tǒngyī Hànzì” zìfú xiǎnshì, zhīchí de shūrù fāngshì bāokuò yīnbiāo pīnyīn zhuǎnhuàn, shǒuxiě shíbié, dāngè Hànzì yǔ fùhécí/cízǔ de pīnyīn zhuǎnhuàn.
Prompts from new media centre editors that ‘users responded intensely’ are often believed as too trivial to be ‘worth writing about’, hence are ultimately ignored by journalists. Editors blame the journalists’ reaction on lack of awareness, that is, journalists lack knowledge of new media, underestimate the intensity of competition between the press industry and commercial new media and overlook user demands. In fact, journalists expressed their concern regarding increasingly intense market competition in both the survey and in-depth interviews. They sensed that when various types of newspapers obtain news clues from new media and as reportage becomes increasingly homogenised, newspapers are confronted with increasingly intense competition.

Say (there is) a fire disaster, which is often reported as an explosion. We often rush to fire disasters, chatting and interviewing with firemen on the site, (to know) there are lots of detonations in fire disasters. Even if not all detonations correspond to explosion, people who have not experienced the scene would likely label the sound ‘Bang’ as explosion before recording in Weibo the ‘explosion’ of fire somewhere… (Journalists) have discrimination, which is something lacked by ordinaries. (Interviewee No. 2)
61 After 9 April those Beijingers with the most negative views of Japan avoided newspapers. See D. Stockmann, “What kind of information does the public demand? Getting the news during the 2005 anti-Japanese protests,” in S. Shirk (ed.), Changing Media, Changing China, forthcoming. Since non-readers were excluded from the statistical analysis, avoidance did not influence the empirical results presented here.

Moreover, most journalists willing to provide news to the new media centres are from party organs, whereas the majority of the metropolis newspaper journalists resisted collaboration. To understand the reason behind such contrast, note that new media centres are governed by party organs in terms of administrative hierarchy and are completely independent of metropolis newspaper offices in terms of finances. Compared with the metropolis newspapers, the party organ has relatively few barriers to the new media centres and a high degree of resource sharing. Such disparity has resulted in an operational obstacle between metropolis newspaper offices and the new media centre. To the new media leadership, this obstacle is precisely the underlying reason for newspapers and the new media to continue to be integrated but stay incompatible. The pattern of this relationship affects journalists’ willingness to collaborate.
The authors adopted a semi-structural interview and provided an outline for the journalists that mainly revolved around the following nine questions: (1) When did you start using new media in your daily work? (2) What is your reason for using new media? (3) What do you think is the role of new media in news production? (4) What measures have been adopted by the press group that you are currently working for in terms of media convergence? (5) Did such measures result in changes in your daily work? If yes, what are such changes? What can you say about these changes? (6) How do you interpret the effects of media convergence on journalists based on your personal experience? (7) What is your overall evaluation of the media convergence within the press group you are working for? (8) Are you aware of the measures of other press groups in terms of media convergence? What is your opinion on their measures? (9) What can you say about the viewpoint of the local press industry that media convergence is the way out for its current predicament? Specific to the interviewees of other categories, the questions varied in terms of how they are stated and their order of arrangement.
59 95% confidence interval ranged between 55 and 90%. Old Wang is only 33% likely to read commercialized papers (95% confidence ranged between 24 and 42%). A dummy variable for having travelled to countries in Europe or North America was dropped from the analysis, because it predicted the use of commercialized papers perfectly. Results can be retrieved from the author upon request.
The press groups in Fujian have adopted the extendedly ameliorated path of media convergence. Firstly, they hired a technology company to establish a platform for converging news production. Secondly, a new media centre was established. Thirdly, a group of editors from the press newsroom were transferred to the centre to handle the new media outlets, particularly the website, Weibo, Wechat and APP. Lastly, a process reconstruction of the news production was undertaken by uniformly importing information from multiple sources into the centre for processing and delivering to new media outlets.
Generally, the journalists’ reluctance to collaborate can be explained under the binary structure of ‘traditional media versus new media’, which is manifested at three levels. At the institutional level, the antithesis of traditional media versus new media is represented as the schism between ‘inside the system’ and ‘outside the system’. Given the impact of new media and the existing ideological control, the Fujian press industry has opted to sacrifice part of its economic gains for political security, which is also an option for journalists ‘inside the system’. At the organisational level, the antithesis is manifested as the enmity between the traditional and the new media departments. Divergent interests have made the leaders and journalists of metropolis newspapers less willing to cooperate with the centre compared with their counterparts from the party organs. At the individual level, the binary structure is manifested as the competition between professional journalists and other we-media runners. Faced with challenges from non-professional information providers, most journalists opt to follow their occupational boundaries and refrain from adding their voice to the new media.
In the early 1990s, Chinese press industry strategically expanded policy limits by using the tension between the state and capitals (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). For example, the operation management strategy through structural ‘zoning’ (Pan, 2000) and the content strategy pursuing newsworthiness to the maximum within the permissible policy scope (Zhao, 1996). Thus, newspapers that transform from ‘Party Mouthpiece’ to ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ (Lee et al., 2006) gained substantial rewards from the market whilst performing their propaganda function.
×