Last year or the year before, I went to the trial over a deputy mayor in Fuzhou. Only another journalist and I went to the whole course of the first trial. He (a newspaper department supervisor) demanded strictly at that time that the number of online figures could not exceed 500. Plus, the next day he scolded (another journalist) in a loud voice, ‘It’s too foolish of you to have (only) offered them the lead of the foregoing news. You should have cut out a bit from each paragraph. You giving these 500 figures to others, who would read the newspaper?’ (Interviewee No. 14)
In addition, technology is equally a vital impetus for China’s media reform. Since the reform and opening-up, the popularisation of satellite technology, the Internet, mobile Internet and other technologies have changed the microscopic form, industrial structure, business model and operational mentality of Chinese media as well as accelerated the progress of media reform (Xiong et al., 2010).
22 Interviews no. 38, 27, 4. See also Z. Zhao and F. Cai, “Maohe er shenli: cong chuanbo neirong de jiaodu kan xinwen yu xuanchuan de chayi” (“Apparently harmonious but actually different: difference between news and propaganda from the perspective of communication content”), Eighth National Conference on Communication Studies, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 2004.
In the early 1990s, Chinese press industry strategically expanded policy limits by using the tension between the state and capitals (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). For example, the operation management strategy through structural ‘zoning’ (Pan, 2000) and the content strategy pursuing newsworthiness to the maximum within the permissible policy scope (Zhao, 1996). Thus, newspapers that transform from ‘Party Mouthpiece’ to ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ (Lee et al., 2006) gained substantial rewards from the market whilst performing their propaganda function.
The definition of full-media convergence is similar to that of media convergence that was developed in light of current practices in Europe and the US. However, as Menke et al. (2016) argued in their comparative study of European convergence journalism, the processes of convergence depend on national and cultural factors, thereby resulting in different convergence practices within specific newsrooms. To gain an improved understanding of the current convergence in China, the factors that make China’s case substantially different from Europe and the US must be considered.
From a new perspective, this article proposes four principles in understanding and interpreting Han dynasty brick and stone pictorial reliefs. First, adopt a three-dimensional viewpoint to describe and interpret the motifs. Second, follow the order of “bottom to top and right to left” in viewing the pictorial presentations. Third, take a holistic approach in appreciation, examining the pictorial reliefs together with the architectures of the tombs, memorial arches and other monumental pieces. And fourth, develop a comprehensive method of investigation, situating the Han pictorial reliefs in the historical context, including social customs, philosophical ideas, intellectual culture, economic development and advances in architecture. In writing the article, the author has done a systematic analysis, using contemporary historical texts, archaeological findings and modern works.
In the early 1990s, Chinese press industry strategically expanded policy limits by using the tension between the state and capitals (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). For example, the operation management strategy through structural ‘zoning’ (Pan, 2000) and the content strategy pursuing newsworthiness to the maximum within the permissible policy scope (Zhao, 1996). Thus, newspapers that transform from ‘Party Mouthpiece’ to ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ (Lee et al., 2006) gained substantial rewards from the market whilst performing their propaganda function. 

Wénlín Hànyǔ xuéxí ruǎnjiàn (Wénlín Wánzhěngbǎn) hé zìdiǎn kuòzhǎn chéngxù de kāifāzhě, Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ Shèhuì Mùdì Gōngsī (SPC) wèi Hànyǔ xuéxí, yánjiū hé kāifā, tígōng ruǎnjiàn jiějué fāng'àn. Wénlín de shǐmìng shì bāngzhù rénmen xuéxí Hànyǔ hé Yīngyǔ, cùjìn bùtóng wénhuà jiān de jiàoyù, lǐjiě, gòngchǔ hé hézuò; fāzhǎn yǔyán hé jiàoyù kēxué, jìshù hé jìqiǎo. Yù liǎojiě gèngduō Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ Shèhuì Mùdì Gōngsī de xiángqíng, qǐng diǎnjī wenlin.com.
After 2008, ‘full-media’ became a keyword with which scholars discussed China’s press industry. Studies that focus on the effects of full-media are categorised into two approaches: media economics and media performance approaches. The media economics approach generalises the experience and lessons of convergence practices and evaluates the influence of media convergence on newspaper development mostly from a business operation perspective by adopting case studies combined with the personal observation of researchers (cf. Tang and Cao, 2015; Yang, 2013). By contrast, the media performance approach analyses the method of content delivery on the new media platforms of newspapers as well as predicts (through content analysis) the influence of convergence on the progress of society’s democratisation from the media ethics perspective (cf. Huang, 2013; Cai, 2011).
For Western journalism researchers, media convergence generally refers to the ‘cooperation and collaboration between formerly distinct media newsrooms and other parts of the modern media company’ (Deuze, 2004: 140). Chinese scholars were considerably inclined to use the phrase ‘full-media’ (Quan Meiti) to describe the convergence process. Full-media, which is a term coined by Chinese media practitioners, implies a figure of oriental holism under the perspective of Chinese traditional philosophy (Ji et al., 2013). Mai (2012: 41) employed observation and in-depth interviews and defined full-media convergence as ‘a mode of structural integration of news production, dissemination and business operation on the platforms of new communication technology’.
Another explanation for journalists’ disinclination to provide news to the new media centre is the emerging conflict between the traditional and new media departments of the Fujian press industry. The main purpose of media convergence is to reconstruct the news production workflow and manifest the notion of ‘collection once, generation into varieties and dissemination in diversities’. Under the dominant path, the original departments of new media outlets are incorporated into the department of new media centre. From the perspective of newspaper office leadership, the timeliness of newspapers falls short of new media; thus, the latter is likely to further decrease the market of the former by intensifying the decline in newspaper readers. The leadership in Fujian’s press groups has been exploring various methods of press release, such as supplying basic facts to new media whilst providing details, background information and other in-depth content to newspapers, giving new media the priority to non-exclusive material but offering newspapers the priority to exclusive information. Discords occasionally occurred between the managements of newspaper offices and new media centre nonetheless.
Dirigido a blogueros, personas influyentes, funcionarios de relaciones públicas, personalised de marketing, aspirantes a periodistas o cualquier persona que quiera aprender más sobre el oficio de la escritura, el curso enseña las habilidades básicas de la escritura profesional: la introducción, la pirámide invertida, las 5 W, las 3 C y, lo más importante de todo, la narración de cuentos.
Yóulǐkǎ (Eureka), Jiālìfúníyàzhōu -- Shéi céng xiǎng zhìzuò gènghǎo de Hànyǔ xuéxí ruǎnjiàn huì gǎibiàn Yàzhōu jìsuànjī shìjiè? Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ fābù le zuìxīn bǎn de jiàoyù ruǎnjiàn, bìng tuīchū yī zhěngtào yòngyú chǔlǐ Zhōngwén, Rìwén hé Hánwén (CJK) zìfú de quánxīn móshì. Zhè yī qīdài yǐjiǔ de bǎnběn tuīchū zhī shí zhèngzhí Hànyǔ xuéxí kè ruǎnjiàn duǎnquē, duì jìsuànjī hé zhìnéng shǒujī kāifāzhě Yàzhōu shìchǎng de wèilái yùcè sìqǐ de shíqī. Shǒuxí zhànlüèjiā Yīlìshābái Lánzhān (Elisabeth Nuboer-Ranjan) yīzhēnjiànxiě de zhǐchū, “Wénlín duì shǒuzhǐ cāozuò shèbèi jìshù hé OCR jìshù de yǐngxiǎng jiāng huì hàndòng zhège hángyè.” Zhè shì zhōngduān yònghù de hǎo xiāoxi, dàn dāng kāifāshāng jìnxíng xiāngyìng tiáozhěng shí kěnéng huì jīfā zhèndàng.
47 On 10 and 12 April, media briefings with Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang were convened. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn, accessed 31 May 2007. For reports see Beijing Youth Daily, 13 April 2008, Jinghua shibao, 13 April 2005, China Daily, 13 April 2005. Similar announcements by the spokesperson of the Public Security Bureau followed. See People's Daily and Beijing Youth Daily, 22 April 2005.
The case study of Fujian indicates that what lies beneath the persistent tension between newspaper offices and new media departments is substantively a conflict of economic interest that results from the competitive relationship amongst various media outlets within the local press group since the period of media conglomeration. Adjusting the administrative structure cannot reduce this tension as long as the economic logic is not thoroughly challenged.
In 2001, the Publicity Department of CPC, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and the General Administration of Press and Publication issued the Opinions on Intensifying Reform on the Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television Industry, thereby establishing media groups concurrently operating across media and regions as well as initiating comprehensive adjustment over the capital structure of media groups. In late 2003, the State Council issued the Notice on Printing and Issuing Two Regulations on Supporting the Transformation of Cultural Industry Development and that of Cultural Institutions into Enterprises in the Trail of Cultural System Reform to separate operative resources, such as the contents of social service and mass entertainment, from present institutional resources, thereby realising capitalisation. Henceforth, the gap in the domain of ownership has been further filled, and media reform has entered the capitalisation stage.
5 See, for example, Li, C.-c., Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (New York: Guilford Press, 1990); Lynch, D.C., After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Esarey, A., “Cornering the market: state strategies for controlling China's commercial media,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2005), pp. 37–83; Zhao, Y., Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); Polumbaum, J. and Lei, X., China Ink: The Changing Face of Chinese Journalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
Prompts from new media centre editors that ‘users responded intensely’ are often believed as too trivial to be ‘worth writing about’, hence are ultimately ignored by journalists. Editors blame the journalists’ reaction on lack of awareness, that is, journalists lack knowledge of new media, underestimate the intensity of competition between the press industry and commercial new media and overlook user demands. In fact, journalists expressed their concern regarding increasingly intense market competition in both the survey and in-depth interviews. They sensed that when various types of newspapers obtain news clues from new media and as reportage becomes increasingly homogenised, newspapers are confronted with increasingly intense competition.
Before and after 2006, Chinese scholars began exploring the potential effects of ‘media convergence’ on news production in the context of digitisation being launched pervasively among press groups. A few of these scholars believe that convergence journalism, as an outgrowth of media convergence, provide gradual changes to the actors of news production, news source, communication medium, content, form and workflow (Cai, 2006).
Yóulǐkǎ (Eureka), Jiālìfúníyàzhōu -- Jì qùnián dì-sì bǎn de zhòngdà shēngjí zhīhòu, Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ jīntiān yòu fābù le Wénlín 4.1.1 bǎn. Xīn bǎnběn kě zài www.wenlinshangdian.com huòqǔ. Wénlín 4.0 huò 4.1 bǎn de dāngqián yònghù kěyǐ miǎnfèi gēngxīn. Wèile ràng Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn gèngjiā shíhuì, Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ yǐjīng xuānbù, wánzhěngbǎn de jiàgé cóng 179 Měiyuán xiàtiáo zhì 99 Měiyuán, shēngjí fèiyòng cóng 49 Měiyuán xiàjiàng zhì 29 Měiyuán. Xīn yònghù zhǐ xū 99 Měiyuán jí kě gòumǎi Wénlín (hán CD, 119 Měiyuán wàijiā yùnfèi); Wénlín 3.x bǎnběn de yònghù gòumǎi kě xiàzài de shēngjí wénjiàn zhǐ xū 29 Měiyuán (hán CD, 49 Měiyuán wàijiā yùnfèi). Xiàzài bǎnběn hé CD bǎnběn dōu kě zài www.wenlinshangdian.com shàng huòdé, yě kě tōngguò Hànyǔ ruǎnjiàn língshòushāng gòumǎi.
In the early 1990s, Chinese press industry strategically expanded policy limits by using the tension between the state and capitals (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). For example, the operation management strategy through structural ‘zoning’ (Pan, 2000) and the content strategy pursuing newsworthiness to the maximum within the permissible policy scope (Zhao, 1996). Thus, newspapers that transform from ‘Party Mouthpiece’ to ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ (Lee et al., 2006) gained substantial rewards from the market whilst performing their propaganda function.
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