In 2006, the General Administration of Press and Publication of China began enforcing the first batch of the ‘China Digital Newspaper Laboratory Programs’, in which 18 national and local press groups were involved in officially unfolding the prelude of the ‘full-media convergence’, namely an intensive integration of new media into the system of traditional press. Since 2012, Chinese press industry has stepped into a ‘cold winter’. Throughout 2014 alone, the total revenue of newspaper circulation experienced a substantial decrease of 25%, with advertising revenue simultaneously decreasing by 15% (Cui and He, 2015). Several scholars suggested that vulnerable profit-making pattern, global economic recession and the decelerating growth rate of the domestic economy were the key factors for the predicament that Chinese press industry is experiencing (Zhao, 2015). However, the industry tends to ascribe the dramatic revenue decline to the prosperity of new media (cf. Cao, 2010; Zhou, 2015).
29 Wan, M., Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Reilly, J., “China's history activism and Sino-Japanese relations,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), pp. 189–216; J.C. Weiss, “Powerful patriots: nationalism, diplomacy and the strategic logic of anti-foreign protest,” PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego, 2008.
Zuìjìn yóu Xiàwēiyí Dàxué Chūbǎnshè chūbǎn de “ABC Hàn-Yīng Yànyǔ Cídiǎn” bāohán le yuē 4000 duō tiáo Hànyǔ yànyǔ, gēnjù Hànyǔ Pīnyīn zhuǎnlù hé Hànzì (biāozhǔn jiǎntǐ), ànzhào yànyǔ shǒu cí de zìmǔ shùnxù páiliè, fùdài de Yīngwén shūmiàn zhíyì (rú bìyào yě huì cǎiyòng yìyì). Qítā nèiróng bāohán: jiǎnyào yòngfǎ zhùshì, láiyuán, bìngxíng biǎodá, cānzhào yǐnyòng yǐjí yìngyòng shílì. Yànyǔ shì yóu yī ge guānjiàncí (Zhōng-Yīngwén) suǒyǐn zēngbǔ de, tǐxiàn zài suǒyǒu shèjí de cítiáo hé huàtí li. Biānzhě duì zhèxiē yànyǔ zài chuántǒng yǔ dāngdài Zhōngguó li de dìngyì, jiégòu, yòngtú hé lìshǐ jìnxíng le xuéshù jièshào, lièchū le wénxiàn jí hé xiāngguān yànyǔ de xuéshù yánjiū.
4 Therefore, some observers suspected that “Anti CNN” messages were part of a larger propaganda effort to discredit reports that contradicted the official line of the state. See New York Times, 25 March 2008; Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 28 March 2008. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang denied any direct links between the website and the Chinese government. http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/fyrth/t419160.htm, accessed 20 July 2008.
Such a characteristic of we-media has further squeezed the price bidding space of the new media of Fujian press industry in the area of content in local journalists’ eyes. What is worse, the procedure of three-phase censorship that deviates from the logic of new media is not strictly followed during the course of converging news production. Delays in the course of censorship have not only impaired the market competitiveness of the new media in terms of content, but also considerably reduced the willingness of journalists to collaborate with the new media centre.