Starting from the emergence of online newspapers, traditional media departments, particularly their leadership, were rather ‘antagonistic’ against new media departments based on the concerns over newspaper circulation. Nevertheless, the competitive relationship between the two types of departments remained unclear because new media departments were situated in a relatively marginalised position inside the press industry. After media convergence along the dominant path was officially launched, original new media departments have been integrated into the new media centre. Vast financial support, manpower and material investments were put to the new media centres of the Fujian press industry, which had reinforced the position of new media department as a ‘rival’ to newspaper offices.
The insistence of local journalists to maintain professional boundaries results from the ideology of professionalism that has permeated throughout China’s journalism education and practice since the reform and opening-up policy. Such insistence also manifests the responsive identification of these journalists under the context in which the journalistic profession is increasingly declining (Donsbach, 2010).
In the early stages after the foundation of China, domestic journalists assumed the primary role of ‘propagators’. From the 1980s to the 1990s, China’s journalists have started to undertake other roles, such as ‘information providers’, ‘information interpreters’, ‘advocators’ and ‘profit makers’. Evidently, their professional roles have become increasingly diversified. In recent years, domestic journalists have gradually ‘returned to the essence of journalism’ in their selection of professional roles (Chen and Jiang, 2008). Most professional journalists have identified with the objective and neutral role of an ‘information provider’ (Zhang and Wu, 2014).
In the early 1990s, Chinese press industry strategically expanded policy limits by using the tension between the state and capitals (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). For example, the operation management strategy through structural ‘zoning’ (Pan, 2000) and the content strategy pursuing newsworthiness to the maximum within the permissible policy scope (Zhao, 1996). Thus, newspapers that transform from ‘Party Mouthpiece’ to ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ (Lee et al., 2006) gained substantial rewards from the market whilst performing their propaganda function.
It is further revealed in this study that the newsroom routines, multiskilling and other factors that significantly affect the attitude of journalists in European and American countries towards media convergence do not sufficiently account for the reluctance of Chinese journalists. The latter is ascribed to the institutional, organisational and individual complexities of the Chinese press industry, within which the competition for market between the traditional and new media departments is implicitly permitted as long as it does not threaten the bottom line of political safety, and the ideology of professionalism with which the journalists identify provides the justification for their willingness to confront the severe challenges from the non-professional information providers (e.g., we-media) by collaborating with the new media centre.
The convergence of the Chinese press industry is thus not merely driven by the effects of market and technological logic from the beginning, unlike in Europe and the US. Actually, administrative fiat plays a pivotal role in each stage of media convergence. In the mid- and late-1990s, the ‘touch the Internet’ (Chuwang) action of traditional news media, namely to establish online newspapers, has expanded from the top to the bottom ‘with the state as the sponsor’ and ‘national media as the leader’ (Yu, 2015). Similarly, the establishment of the collaborative relationship between newspapers and new media on news production at the beginning of the 21st century could not be realised without the intervention of administrative power, including approval for the construction of major news websites to produce original contents. The wave of media convergence that began in 2006 is also inseparable from the official ‘top-down design’. In the beginning, the General Administration of Press and Publication was concurrently the project sponsor and supervisor. Thereafter, the media convergence of the central and local press industry has been highly dependent on financial funding from the government.
Specifically, information released in new media outlets emphasise timeliness. The irreconcilable conflict between such requirement and the principle of accuracy in news reportage concerns many journalists. In China, the common rule of thumb in terms of news production is that ‘the writer is responsible for the consequences of this article’. Journalists are obliged to take full responsibility for all issues engendered by the news under their name. The risk of ‘more mistakes with more releases’ is a shadow that follows news production as a by-product of the censorship system. Thus, the journalists in Fujian’s press groups disregard the new system of censorship as a ‘buffer’ that could protect them from various risks, particularly political ones. When journalists believe that the risk they may undertake outweighs the financial return they will attain, they choose not to cooperate.

The case study of Fujian indicates that what lies beneath the persistent tension between newspaper offices and new media departments is substantively a conflict of economic interest that results from the competitive relationship amongst various media outlets within the local press group since the period of media conglomeration. Adjusting the administrative structure cannot reduce this tension as long as the economic logic is not thoroughly challenged.


Wénlín yì wéi “qúnyīng huì” yǔ gōngsī míng xiāngtóng de shì, Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ de chéngxùyuán dàitóurén dōu shì shēnjiān Hànyǔ yǔyánxuéjiā hé jìsuànjī kēxué gōngchéngshī liǎng zhǒng shēnfèn. Guānchá děngshì liǎngbiān, zhè ràng Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ de chuàngshǐrén hé zǒngcái Tuōmǎsī E. Bìxiǎopǔ (Thomas E. Bishop) chóngxīn fāxiàn le Hànyǔ shénmì de 36 bǐ “zìmǔ”, jìn'ér yīláoyǒngyì de jiějué le Unicode “quēzì” de wèntí. Zhèxiē chuántǒng jiǎoběn yuánsù yīzhí yǐlái dōu bèi ruǎnjiàn kāifāzhě suǒ hūshì. “CDL yīzhí shì Wénlín de yī bùfèn, dàn wǒmen wèi fāxiàn qiánzài yǔyán, zhídào Wénlín 4.0 bǎn tuīchū. Rújīn yònghù kěyǐ chákàn bìng cāokòng rènhé kě zài bǐhuà kuàng zhōng chákàn de zìfú de CDL miáoshù,” Bìxiǎopǔ shuōdào. Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ shì Unicode Xiéhuì de róngyù huìyuán, zì 2000 nián yǐlái yīzhí zhìlìyú míhé CJK shùjù chǔlǐ shang de chājù.

After 2008, ‘full-media’ became a keyword with which scholars discussed China’s press industry. Studies that focus on the effects of full-media are categorised into two approaches: media economics and media performance approaches. The media economics approach generalises the experience and lessons of convergence practices and evaluates the influence of media convergence on newspaper development mostly from a business operation perspective by adopting case studies combined with the personal observation of researchers (cf. Tang and Cao, 2015; Yang, 2013). By contrast, the media performance approach analyses the method of content delivery on the new media platforms of newspapers as well as predicts (through content analysis) the influence of convergence on the progress of society’s democratisation from the media ethics perspective (cf. Huang, 2013; Cai, 2011).
Lā Qiáolā (La Jolla), Jiālìfúníyàzhōu -- Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ xuānbù Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn 4.2 bǎn yǔ gōngsī wǎngzhàn (wenlin.com) tóngbù lóngzhòng tuīchū. Wénlín 4.2 de xīn gōngnéng bāokuò kuòzhǎn de zìdiǎn, cídiǎn, Yīng-Hàn, Shuōwén Jiězì (Zhōngguó gǔdài Hànyǔ zìdiǎn) Yǐjí Wénlín zhuānyòng de CDL zìtǐ (wenlin.com/cdl) de zhòngduō gǎijìn, zìtǐ mùqián yǒu chāoguò 96000 ge CDL miáoshù. Qítā zēngqiáng gōngnéng, bāokuò gǎijìn sōusuǒ wénjiàn gōngnéng de jièmiàn, zhòngyào de jièmiàn xīn gōngnéng, yǐjí yīxiē xīn de hé gǎijìnle de gāojí xuǎnxiàng. Duìyú Mac OS X (10.7 huò gèng gāo bǎnběn), zhěnggè yìngyòng chéngxù yǐjīng chóngjiàn wéi 64 wèi Cocoa yìngyòng chéngxù, zhīchí gāo fēnbiànlǜ de Retina gāoqīng xiǎnshìpíng.
Such a characteristic of we-media has further squeezed the price bidding space of the new media of Fujian press industry in the area of content in local journalists’ eyes. What is worse, the procedure of three-phase censorship that deviates from the logic of new media is not strictly followed during the course of converging news production. Delays in the course of censorship have not only impaired the market competitiveness of the new media in terms of content, but also considerably reduced the willingness of journalists to collaborate with the new media centre.
The case study of Fujian indicates that what lies beneath the persistent tension between newspaper offices and new media departments is substantively a conflict of economic interest that results from the competitive relationship amongst various media outlets within the local press group since the period of media conglomeration. Adjusting the administrative structure cannot reduce this tension as long as the economic logic is not thoroughly challenged.
Starting from the emergence of online newspapers, traditional media departments, particularly their leadership, were rather ‘antagonistic’ against new media departments based on the concerns over newspaper circulation. Nevertheless, the competitive relationship between the two types of departments remained unclear because new media departments were situated in a relatively marginalised position inside the press industry. After media convergence along the dominant path was officially launched, original new media departments have been integrated into the new media centre. Vast financial support, manpower and material investments were put to the new media centres of the Fujian press industry, which had reinforced the position of new media department as a ‘rival’ to newspaper offices.
×