As national policy is further loosened, the Chinese media have begun exploring diversified modes of business operation. In 1996, the Guangzhou Daily Newspaper Group announced its foundation, thereby unfolding the prelude of conglomeration of Chinese media. However, the process of conglomeration accelerated significantly only during the turn of the millennium, which has also benefited from the promulgation of a series of polices.
Lā Qiáolā (La Jolla), Jiālìfúníyàzhōu -- Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn hé CDL zìtǐ jìshù de kāifāzhě -- Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ, yóu yī jiā pǔtōng qǐyè (gōngsī) zhuǎnxíng chéngwéi “shèhuì mùdì gōngsī” (SPC gōngsī). Tāngmǔ Bìxiǎopǔ (Tom Bishop) zhǔxí jiěshì le zhè yī juédìng: “Wǒmen de jiàoyù shǐmìng, cǐkè, zài fǎlǜ shang, chéngwéi le wǒmen cúnzài de gēnběn yìyì. Zhè yī xīn dìngwèi wèi ràng gèngduō de rén cānyù dào wǒmen de zǔzhī zhōng pūpíng le dàolù, tóngshí jiāng wǒmen de fāzhǎn tíshēng dào xīn de shuǐpíng. Xiànzài wǒmen yǒuquán yě bìxū zài wǒmen gōngsī de zhāngchéng zhōng guīdìng: jiàoyù jí qítā shèhuì mùdì shì wǒmen de zuìgāo zōngzhǐ.” Chúle yào kuòchōng yī zhī yōuxiù tuánduì, bāokuò cídiǎn biānzuǎn, yǔyánxué, biānchéng hé jiàoyù de dǐngjiān zhuānjiā, Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ Gōngsī SPC dǎsuàn bǎ cídiǎn hé qítā xuéxí cáiliào fābù dào wǎngshàng, ràng quánqiú fúhé zīgé de gòngxiànzhě kěyǐ xiézuò gǎishàn bìng xiūzhèng Zhòng-Yāng zīyuánkù. Gōngsī de xīn dìngwèi biǎomíng línjìn fābù de Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn 4.2 bǎn jiāng yǔ zhòngdà shēngjí hòu de gōngsī wǎngzhàn tóngbù lóngzhòng tuīchū.
Guānyú “Hàn-Yīng Yànyǔ Cídiǎn”: Xiàndài Yǔyán qīkān duì Luósēnnuò (Rohsenow) cídiǎn de píngjià shì “dàigěi rén yúkuài tǐyàn, yìyú shǐyòng ... wèi pǔtōng Yīngyǔ dúzhě kāiqǐ le Zhōngguó mínjiān zhìhuì de bǎokù ... duì rènhé jíbié de yǔyán xuéshēng hé rènhé xūyào jīngpì géyán de rén dōu shì jí jù xīyǐnlì qiě shífēn shòuyì de.” (89, 2005). Yóu Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ (zhǐzhìbǎn de biānzhìzhě) kāifā de xīnbǎn ruǎnjiàn wèi xuéxí yànyǔ zhè yī bǎoguì zīyuán zēngtiān le xīn de wéidù. Ruǎnjiàn bǎnběn zhuān wèi pèihé Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn 4.2 huò gèng gāo bǎnběn shǐyòng ér shèjì. Yōngyǒu Wénlín qiángdà de ABC diànzǐ cídiǎn de quánbù jíhé, yìwèizhe jiǎntǐ hé fántǐ Zhōngwén de dúzhě kěyǐ shíshí fǎngwèn gèzhǒnggèyàng de cítiáo yǐ tànqiú Luósēnnuò jiàoshòu jīngliáng fānyì de wēimiào zhī chù, bìng lǐjiě Zhōngwén yànyǔ gēng shēnkè de hányì.

The convergence of the Chinese press industry is thus not merely driven by the effects of market and technological logic from the beginning, unlike in Europe and the US. Actually, administrative fiat plays a pivotal role in each stage of media convergence. In the mid- and late-1990s, the ‘touch the Internet’ (Chuwang) action of traditional news media, namely to establish online newspapers, has expanded from the top to the bottom ‘with the state as the sponsor’ and ‘national media as the leader’ (Yu, 2015). Similarly, the establishment of the collaborative relationship between newspapers and new media on news production at the beginning of the 21st century could not be realised without the intervention of administrative power, including approval for the construction of major news websites to produce original contents. The wave of media convergence that began in 2006 is also inseparable from the official ‘top-down design’. In the beginning, the General Administration of Press and Publication was concurrently the project sponsor and supervisor. Thereafter, the media convergence of the central and local press industry has been highly dependent on financial funding from the government.
6 J.J. Kennedy, “Maintaining popular support for the Chinese Communist Party: the influence of education and the state-controlled media,” Political Studies, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2009), pp. 517–36; Chen, X. and Shi, T., “Media effects on political confidence and trust in the People's Republic of China in the post-Tiananmen period,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2001), pp. 84–118.

As part of a political project to seize ‘the commanding heights’ of information dissemination, namely to strengthen the traditional press’s influence in shaping public opinion, practices of media convergence within Fujian’s press groups are substantively compliant with the ‘top-down design’ that is aimed to effectively circumvent political risks and maximise fiscal investment and market return. To bypass the political minefield and manage other risks that the new media centre may encounter whilst promoting convergence, Fujian’s press groups built a three-phase censorship system of ‘editor–new media centre director–press leadership’, among many other measures. Rigorous controls over convergence risks have enabled the Fujian press industry to gain the anticipated policy bonus. For example, the new media centre, for which the Xiamen Daily Group invested over one million Yuan, significantly affected municipal leaders, thereby earning over 20 million Yuan of financial subsidies for the centre in 2015.
The majority of the scholarly analyses of convergence under the culture-oriented perspective have focused on its effects on routines, skills and roles. Several studies indicate that media convergence has changed the routine of information gathering, editing and reporting within newsrooms (Phillips et al., 2009); made journalistic practices considerably stressful with the emergence of multiskilling (Wallace, 2013) and posed severe challenges on the traditional roles of news media, such as ‘gatekeeper’ (Williams and Delli Carpini, 2000) and ‘agenda-setter’ (Quandt and Singer, 2009), as the tendency of convergence between professional- and user-produced content becomes increasingly appreciable. Other studies that employed the same approach indicate that although journalists are confronted with multiple challenges, they do not necessarily take a negative stance to evaluating media convergence. Accordingly, the degree of media convergence (Saltzis and Dickinson, 2008) and size of a media organisation (Mishra, 2014) can affect the perceptions journalists have on convergence journalism, thereby affecting their attitude towards media convergence.

Simply speaking, media convergence is the process of integrating new media into the system of traditional media. Thus, journalists’ attitude towards the new media constitutes the foundation for better understanding of journalists’ attitude towards the convergence between traditional media and new media. Moreover, media convergence carries a prognosis that news production will move further to the direction towards timeliness, interactivity and use-centredness. Given that the newsroom routine adjusts rapidly, particularly as the audience increasingly engages in news production and professional boundaries blur further, the following questions need to be answered: Will the viewpoint of journalists towards new media become considerably negative? How will this attitude affect their perception of the convergence process between new media and traditional media?
The first phase of China’s media reform, that is, the marketisation of Chinese media, began when the State Administration of Publication on the National Press Managers’ Conference officially announced in December 1978 the decision to pursue the business operation of newspapers. Accordingly, a media system with Chinese characteristics, that is, the ‘enterprise management of institutions’, was established. In 1983, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated Document No. 37 to encourage business operation within media organisations.
Another explanation for journalists’ disinclination to provide news to the new media centre is the emerging conflict between the traditional and new media departments of the Fujian press industry. The main purpose of media convergence is to reconstruct the news production workflow and manifest the notion of ‘collection once, generation into varieties and dissemination in diversities’. Under the dominant path, the original departments of new media outlets are incorporated into the department of new media centre. From the perspective of newspaper office leadership, the timeliness of newspapers falls short of new media; thus, the latter is likely to further decrease the market of the former by intensifying the decline in newspaper readers. The leadership in Fujian’s press groups has been exploring various methods of press release, such as supplying basic facts to new media whilst providing details, background information and other in-depth content to newspapers, giving new media the priority to non-exclusive material but offering newspapers the priority to exclusive information. Discords occasionally occurred between the managements of newspaper offices and new media centre nonetheless.
In general, similar to most local press groups in China, Fujian’s press groups have started advancing the convergence between newspapers and new media (i.e., in the news production area) only during the past two years without radically altering the existing system of the industry, that is, not touching the core zone of the media convergence–structure adjustment and business operation convergence. Therefore, the Fujian press industry makes a proper case of analysis for this study due to its typical nature in terms of convergence progress and path selection.

In the early 1990s, Chinese press industry strategically expanded policy limits by using the tension between the state and capitals (Akhavan-Majid, 2004). For example, the operation management strategy through structural ‘zoning’ (Pan, 2000) and the content strategy pursuing newsworthiness to the maximum within the permissible policy scope (Zhao, 1996). Thus, newspapers that transform from ‘Party Mouthpiece’ to ‘Party Publicity Inc.’ (Lee et al., 2006) gained substantial rewards from the market whilst performing their propaganda function.
Males and females accounted for 49.6% and 50.4%, respectively, of the total number of respondents. The respondents with a degree of and below junior college accounted for 1.8%, those with bachelor’s degree accounted for 83.5% and those with a master’s degree or above accounted for 14.7%. Among the respondents, 33.2% came from party organs, whilst 66.8% came from metropolis newspapers. The mean age of the respondents was 31 years old (M = 30.63, SD = 6.35) and the mean number of years at work was 8 (M = 7.62, SD = 6.50).
From a new perspective, this article proposes four principles in understanding and interpreting Han dynasty brick and stone pictorial reliefs. First, adopt a three-dimensional viewpoint to describe and interpret the motifs. Second, follow the order of “bottom to top and right to left” in viewing the pictorial presentations. Third, take a holistic approach in appreciation, examining the pictorial reliefs together with the architectures of the tombs, memorial arches and other monumental pieces. And fourth, develop a comprehensive method of investigation, situating the Han pictorial reliefs in the historical context, including social customs, philosophical ideas, intellectual culture, economic development and advances in architecture. In writing the article, the author has done a systematic analysis, using contemporary historical texts, archaeological findings and modern works.
Before and after 2009, all major press groups in Fujian started to establish e-newspapers and transfer the newspaper contents to their official news websites to cope with the loss of readers as a result of the prevalence of computer technology as well as to maintain and expand the influence of traditional media. The popularity of Weibo and WeChat emerged between 2011 and 2012, thereby prompting the local press groups in Fujian to try out both platforms. During this period, newspapers were the pillar of the press groups’ revenue. Within most press groups in Fujian, Weibo and WeChat remained under the operation of newspaper editors and journalists on a part-time basis and received limited emphasis from the leadership.
Fujian’s case indicates that new media outlets tend to be ‘domesticated’ in terms of converging news production. Firstly, a multilevel censorship system has been established, thereby ensuring that the new media content is under supervision. Secondly, new media outlets are subject to a bureaucratic style of management with low decision-making efficiency.
The press groups in Fujian have adopted the extendedly ameliorated path of media convergence. Firstly, they hired a technology company to establish a platform for converging news production. Secondly, a new media centre was established. Thirdly, a group of editors from the press newsroom were transferred to the centre to handle the new media outlets, particularly the website, Weibo, Wechat and APP. Lastly, a process reconstruction of the news production was undertaken by uniformly importing information from multiple sources into the centre for processing and delivering to new media outlets.
Despite the party-market corporatism, Lee et al. (2007) explained that significant multiplicity continues to exist in the developmental path of local media because of differences in power structure and market maturity. Guangzhou media represent the ‘market competition within party-state ideological limits’ pattern. For example, three press groups in Guangzhou compete fiercely with separate content strategies, while Guangzhou Daily and Yangchen Evening Daily cater primarily to daily life relevance and avoid ‘grand narratives’, Nanfang City Daily and Nanfang Weekend often expose official wrongdoings and advocate liberal ideas. Beijing media that are hierarchically structured in parallel to national, ministerial and municipal levels of administrative authorities compete both horizontally and vertically for power and market on behalf of their patrons and constituencies, thus represent the ‘managed diversity through a precarious of the emerging interest politics among counterbalancing power bases’ pattern. For example, as the authors put it, the supreme leader Mao had to turn to the Shanghai press to wage wars against the Beijing Daily on the eve of the period of the Cultural Revolution because his influence at that point could not fully reach the constituency of the Beijing Daily (Lee et al., 2007).
Lā Qiáolā (La Jolla), Jiālìfúníyàzhōu -- Wénlín Yánjiūsuǒ Shèhuì Mùdì Gōngsī (SPC), Wénlín Hànyǔ Xuéxí Ruǎnjiàn 4.2 bǎn fāxíng gōngsī, xuānbù chénglì dì-yī rèn dǒngshìhuì. Dǒngshìhuì chéngyuán bāokuò: Xiàwēiyí Dàxué Mǎnuò'ā Xiàoqū Zhōngguó Yánjiū Zhōngxīn fùzhǔrèn, Kǒngzǐ Yánjiūsuǒ zhǔrèn Rèn Yǒuméi (Cynthia Ning) bóshì; Shèngdìyàgē Zhōulì Dàxué Zhōngwén Xiàngmù gùwèn, “Měiguó Zhōngwén Jiàoshī Xuéhuì Zázhì” zhǔbiān Zhāng Zhèngshēng (Zheng-sheng Zhang); Richard Cook bóshì (yánjiū yǔ kāifā fùzǒngcái); Elisabeth Nuboer-Ranjhan (zhànlüè guānxì fùzǒngcái); Mark Roblee(yíngxiāo fùzǒngcái) hé Tom Bishop (zǒngcái).
Despite the party-market corporatism, Lee et al. (2007) explained that significant multiplicity continues to exist in the developmental path of local media because of differences in power structure and market maturity. Guangzhou media represent the ‘market competition within party-state ideological limits’ pattern. For example, three press groups in Guangzhou compete fiercely with separate content strategies, while Guangzhou Daily and Yangchen Evening Daily cater primarily to daily life relevance and avoid ‘grand narratives’, Nanfang City Daily and Nanfang Weekend often expose official wrongdoings and advocate liberal ideas. Beijing media that are hierarchically structured in parallel to national, ministerial and municipal levels of administrative authorities compete both horizontally and vertically for power and market on behalf of their patrons and constituencies, thus represent the ‘managed diversity through a precarious of the emerging interest politics among counterbalancing power bases’ pattern. For example, as the authors put it, the supreme leader Mao had to turn to the Shanghai press to wage wars against the Beijing Daily on the eve of the period of the Cultural Revolution because his influence at that point could not fully reach the constituency of the Beijing Daily (Lee et al., 2007).
Both viewpoints have consistent cores, that is, the adherence to the principle that ‘content shall dominate’, which underscores the importance of content resources in maintaining and promoting the influential power of newspapers and in assisting newspapers to step out of the ‘cold winter’. This situation further evokes the hesitation of and the resistance from the journalists of the Fujian press industry as they maintain their professional dignity with effort.
CDL zìtǐ shùjùkù bāohán chāoguò 100000 ge zìfú. Shǐyòng CDL biǎoshì Zhōngwén bìng méiyǒu shùliàng hé fùzá dù de xiànzhì. CDL JavaScript kù shūchū chún SVG lùjìng zìfúchuàn, yǐbiàn wánquán kòngzhì CDL zìfú zài yìngyòng chéngxù hé wǎngzhàn shǐyòng de fāng fāngmiàn miàn. Kāifā tuánduì de guānjiàn chéngyuán David Chanin pínglùn dào: "CDL JavaScript kù wèi wǎngyè duān hé yídòng duān yìngyòng chéngxù kāifā rényuán kāichuàng xìngdì shíxiànle qīngsōng jiāng wénzì bǐhuà dònghuà hé jiāohù shì wénzì shūxiě cèshì tiānjiā dào yìngyòng chéngxù zhōng. Wénlín CDL JavaScript kě miǎnfèi shǐyòng, xū zūnzhào AGPL kāiyuán xǔkě. Shìyòng yú “bì yuán xiàngmù” de Wénlín CDL JavaScript qǐng liánxì [email protected] huòdé xǔkě. Chákàn wǒmen de fúwù tiáokuǎn, liǎojiě xiángqíng. Ruòyào shǐyòng Wénlín CDL JavaScript, qǐng diǎnjī cǐchù.
In the past when our Weibo and WeChat accounts were not taken over (by the new media centre of Xiamen Daily)… Journalists running to the spot would make an instant call to our editors, saying how a piece was on WeChat… Nowadays, the journalists no longer have such enthusiasm… Anyway, whatever the achievement is, they are not ours. (Interviewee No. 8)

29 Wan, M., Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Reilly, J., “China's history activism and Sino-Japanese relations,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006), pp. 189–216; J.C. Weiss, “Powerful patriots: nationalism, diplomacy and the strategic logic of anti-foreign protest,” PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego, 2008.


Ding, FZ, Wei, L (2014) Occupational dilemma of China’s journalists in an era of social media: A study of journalists’ occupational discourses on Weibo in Journalists’ Day from 2010 to 2014 (Shehuihua meiti shidai zhongguo xinwenren de zhiye kunjing: Jiyu 2010–2014 nian ‘jizhejie’ xinwenren weibo zhiye huayu bianqian de kaocha). Shanghai Journalism Review (Xinwen jizhe) 12: 3–9.


In September 1992, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee recommended that the main direction in future adjustments of the industrial structure should be to ‘actively promote the tertiary industry’. In 1993, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council officially included the media industry in the tertiary industry in the Decisions on Accelerating Development in the Tertiary Industry, while maintaining this industry’s attributes as a propaganda and administrative institution.
93 Lai Fei. Jining, zaozhuangdiqu huaxiangshi gailun (An Introduction to Han Stone Pictorial Reliefs at the Jining and Zaozhuang Region) in Zhongguo huaxiangshi quanji, Shandong Han huaxiangshi (di er ji) (Complete Collection of Chinese Stone Pictorial Reliefs, Shandong Stone Pictorial Reliefs (Volume 2))(Jinan: Shandong meishu chubanshe, Zhengzhou: Henan meishu chubanshe, 2000), 19.
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